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I. INTRODUCTION
The military vans (MILVANS) presently in use by the U.S.
Navy are actually owned by and are on loan from the U.S.
Army. Because of the pending implementation of the Army's
containerized ammunition distribution system, these con-
tainers are being recalled by the Army. This recall is ex-
pected to be completed by September 1983 and would leave the
Navy in a precarious position regarding containerized cargo
movement if orderly container replacement is not accomplished
in a timely fashion. For example, over three hundred Army-
owned containers are currently in use in the Subic Bay-Diego
Garcia logistics pipeline in support of Indian Ocean
operations.
A. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
Because of the potential negative impact on material
movement within the Navy caused by the Army's decision to
recall its containers, this thesis examines the containeri-
zation needs of the Navy precipitated by this recall and
attempts to determine the most cost-effective means to meet
these needs. Hence, the objective of this thesis is to
evaluate specific, viable alternatives to meet these needs
and, in so doing, develop a framework for analysis that de-
cision makers may effectively employ further, as desired.
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B. PREVIEW OF THE THESIS
The following chapter introduces containerization by
presenting its definition in today's parlance as well as its
history. Chapter II also addresses container standardiza-
tion, the various types of common containers and their uses,
and major container handling equipment. Next, the advantages
of this intermodal transportation method are discussed.
Chapter III turns toward a discussion of the development
of the military-owned standard container and containerized
cargo movement within the Department of Defense. After a
brief overview of the Defense Transportation System, the role
of the Military Sealift Command as the agency responsible
for managing the military's sealift capability is presented.
Chapter III concludes vJith the Department of Defense policy
on container sealift.
Chapter IV provides the evolution and definition of the
problem being analyzed: determining the most cost-effective
means of replacing lost container assets.
Chapter V presents an overview of commercial ocean con-
tainer acquisition. As such, this chapter serves as the
foundation upon which alternative problem solutions will be
built.
Chapter VI lists the alternative problem solutions evalu-
ated and the criterion used for their ranking. A cost model




Chapter VII provides the results of a cost sensitivity
analysis performed on the baseline costs of each alternative
and establishes the relative importance of the cost compo-
nents within the cost model.




II. INTRODUCTION TO CONTAINERIZATIQN
Containerization has been acclaimed a revolution in
transport and is considered by some to be one of the most
significant developments in the history of transportation:
The application. . .of the unit load including containeriza-
tion and palletization principle is almost as significant
an advance in global economy as the transition from sail
to steam, from wooden to iron ships. [Ref. 1: 46]
The evolution within the freight transportation industry
toward containers has provided a significant impetus for
change to the links of society. New methods of cargo ship-
ment have been developed by those carriers accepting con-
tainerization as a more efficient means of material movement.
Railroads have been widely using standard size containers
since the 19 50 's. Readily adopted by shippers and railroads,
the concept of containers being attached to and detached from
flatcars is the oldest form of containerized shipping.
Very few world-wide movements of containers are achieved
without the service of truck lines, whether for a line-haul
or for pickup and delivery service. Indeed, many truck lines
have interchange agreements with shippers and other transport
modes covering inland container movements.
Initiated by the Lockheed L-lOO Hercules, the advent of
the wide-bodied commercial aircraft extended the utilization
of the standard container for cargo movement to the airline
13

industry. The use of wide-bodied commercial aircrafts as
cargo transports has been closely tied to the airborne ship-
ment of containers.
The use of containers, however, is perhaps most dis-
cernible within the maritime industry. Fleets of break-bulk
ships are becoming obsolete. Shipyards have profited from
contracts to convert break-bulk ships to containerships as
well as to build ships exclusively for container cargo move-
ment. Ports and exchange facilities have been converted or
constructed based on the concept of containerization.
Container use is not restricted to the individual modes
of rail, road, air and water. Standardization of the con-
tainer, "...the rock on which container traffic is built"
[Ref. 2: 597], has made it compatible with virtually any
transportation mode and with nearly all container handling
equipment. The container is clearly an intermodal and in-
ternational device for the efficient movement of cargo.
A. CONTAINERIZATION DEFINED
Although containerization has been acclaimed a revolution
in transport, the container is functionally no more than a
box. In common with every other box, containers economize
in the number of movements required to convey a given quan-
tity of goods and afford these goods greater protection from
damage and loss than they would otherwise receive. There
are, however, two unique features of this particular box:
14

(1) it has been standardized for interraodal use, and (2) it
is large; therefore, making the amount of transshipment re-
quired for any given amount of goods minimal. [Ref. 3: 11]
Containerization refers to the use of shipping containers
in conjunction with other means of transport in the movement
of goods. By this method, goods normally move from origin to
destination without unloading or reloading. The term con-
tainer, when used in connection with the containerization
concept, refers only to those containers too large for manual
handling, which are reusable, and which do not have wheels
permanently attached. This particular definition excludes
barrels, drums, vehicles, and conventional packing. More
specifically, a freight container is an article of transport
equipment:
1. Of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough
to be suitable for repeated use;
2. Specially designed to facilitate the carriage of goods,
by one or more modes of transport, without intermediate
reloading;
3. Fitted with devices permitting its ready handling, par-
ticularly its transfer from one mode of transport to
another;
4. Designed so as to be easy to fill and empty; and
5. Having an internal volume of one cubic meter or more.
[Ref. 2: 597]
Another definition of containerization which also em-
bodies the idea of efficiency is "...the placing of shipments
in various forms of boxes, containers and the like, for the
15

ease of handling between origin and final destination."
[Ref. 1: 46-47]
Still another definition places emphasis on the container
as a common denominator in transportation. It must be inter-
changeable much as the uniform coupling pin and standard
gauge of rail track for all railroad cars.
Although definitions differ, the connotation of contain-
erization in carrier and shipper parlance involves the con-
cept of placing goods in a relatively large "box" common to
all modes of transportation (except pipeline) to allow the
goods to move via any mode or between the modes with a mini-
mum actual handling of the goods themselves.
B. THE INLAND AND MARITIME ORIGINS OF CONTAINERIZATION
As early as the 1800 's, large companies used containers
to protect cargo from the elements of weather and in 1847 the
container appeared in the form of "piggyback" operations;
that is, some railroads provided tariffs and services under
which farm wagons loaded with produce could be transported
without transfer of lading. This was a form of both con-
tainerization and " . . .of piggyback—especially when the farm
wagons contained pigs." [Ref. 1: 47]
It could be argued that this was "piggybacking" and not
containerization. However, strictly interpreted, "piggy-
backing" and "fishybacking" today are forms of container
service, with the variation that the container is capable of
16

being moved along the highway as well as being rolled on or
off ships or flatcars. The development of this early service
was scattered and sporadic, and was eventually discontinued.
Prior to the advent of long distance motor carrier ser-
vice, the household goods movers' industry used containers
for shipment of household goods by rail. A sizable fleet of
steel containers, measuring eight feet high, eight feet wide
and fourteen feet long, was developed, and household goods
were shipped via rail to all points in the United States.
The household movers, however, experienced difficulty in the
retrieval of containers and in obtaining prompt transporta-
tion for containers from points of origin. After the devel-
opment of the motor carrier, this container use was exchanged
for the more flexible service of the trucking industry.
During the 1920 's and 1930 's container service was of-
fered by the New York Central and Pennsylvania railroads, but
the rate structure and other problems eventually discouraged
its growth. It was not until the 1950 's that the present
widespread use of containers by the railways began to
materialize.
The introduction of containers to the maritime shipping
industry was a logical extension of their earlier use in
overland freight transportation. In 1956, Sea-Land, which
had its origins in road haulage, started its containership
service between New York and Puerto Rico after experimental
shipments the previous year between New York and Houston.
17

Soon after, Matson started its U.S. West Coast-Hawaii con-
tainer service. But for almost a decade, other shipping
lines ignored or rejected the potentialities of containeriza-
tion, even though by 1966 Sea-Land had nineteen container-
ships and Matson fourteen [Ref. 3: 12]. The turning point
appears to have been 1965, when Sea-Land announced its in-
tention to enter the transatlantic trade routes with contain-
erships. The reaction of established lines on that route was
immediate. Each competitor announced its intention to mod-
ernize existing vessels and build specialized containerships
.
Ports on the U.S. East Coast and in Europe soon followed with
their plans for container berths. Similar developments oc-
curred in the Pacific trade routes when the Japanese govern-
ment announced in 1966 a massive containership and berth
development program.
Another major force behind the eventual boom in maritime
container transport was the U.S. military. At about the same
time as Sea-Land entered the North Atlantic trade routes, the
U.S. Army became actively interested in containerization . It
had long operated its Container Express (CONEX) unit load
system, but the Vietnam war build-up provided added encour-
agement to improve supply methods. At the beginning of 1966,
seven hundred containers a month left West Coast ports for
South-East Asia; by the end of the year the monthly rate had
risen to 1,500 [Ref. 3: 14]. This provided a considerable
stimulus to the shipping lines.
18

However, the most important stimulus to both the inland
and maritime use of containers was standardization of the
container and its corner lifting devices. A world-wide sys-
tem of door-to-door transportation could now be established
to handle containers of given dimensions. Container ships,
cranes, trailers, railway cars, and inland and maritime ter-
minals could be constructed based on these given dimensions.
C. CONTAINER STANDARDIZATION
Without international agreement on basic dimensions and
key specifications, containerization would have been severely
limited by technical barriers and would not have achieved its
present acceptance by the various modes. Created by a 1967
international agreement signed in Moscow, the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) , through its 150 tech-
nical committees, endeavors to provide standardization guide
lines for such diverse fields as plastic chemicals, machine
tools and nuclear energy.
The work of international standardization in the field of
freight containers is carried out by Technical Committee 104
of ISO. The committee is composed of thirty-one active mem-
ber countries, and is continually advised by such member
representatives as the American National Standards Institute
of the United States and numerous qualified international
organizations [Ref. 4: 21]. ISO standards issued by Com-
mittee 104 are published documentation which serve to clarify
19

and coordinate such aspects of the container industry as
definitions and technical data.
In the area of containerization, ten ISO standards have
been published covering dimensions; ratings or weight; speci-
fications for construction, use and maintenance; testing of
various types of containers and their associated handling
gear; and physical markings. Because it sets forth the
standards for dimensions and ratings of freight containers,
ISO Standard 688-1973 is of particular interest. This pub-
lication establishes three general classifications or series
of containers with various container designations included in
each and with specific maximum weight ratings assigned to
each designation. Series One includes containers from five
to forty feet in length and contains seven designation
groups. Series Two and Three, composed of three container
designations each, are generally shorter in length and weigh
considerably less than their Series One counterparts.
Each of the thirteen container designations is assigned
a height, width and length with associated tolerances, and a
rating defined as the maximum permissible combined weight of
the freight container and its contents [Ref. 2; 597]. Al-
though other container sizes exist, ISO Standard 688-1973 can
be used to model the standard container in general as an
eight foot by eight foot end section with lengths of ten,
twenty, thirty and forty feet with ratings of 22,400, 44,800,
56,000 and 67,200 pounds respectively.
20

D. TYPES OF CONTAINERS AND THEIR USES
ISO Standard R830-1968 addresses the general purpose
freight container as well as characteristics of freight con-
tainers. Specifically, this standard defines the general
purpose freight container as a "freight container of rec-
tangular shape, weatherproof, for transporting and storing
a number of unit loads, packages or bulk material; that con-
fines and protects the contents from loss or damage; that
can be separated from the means of transport, handled as a
unit load and transshipped without rehandling the contents"
[Ref. 2: 600]. General purpose containers are normally con-
structed of steel, aluminum, or fiberglass reinforced plastic
laminated plywood and are designed on three broad principles:
durability, stackability and versatility [Ref. 5: 94].
ISO Standard R830-1968 further characterizes containers
as collapsible or non-collapsible. Although both are of
rigid construction, the major components of the collapsible
freight container are not permanently assembled and can be
folded or disassembled to facilitate storage and back-haul of
empty containers. ISO Standard 1946 also classifies general
cargo containers into five structural types: (1) closed, in-
cluding opening roof, (2) open top, (3) open side, (4) open
top/open sides, and (5) open top/open sides/open ends.
A variety of containers are in existence in addition to
the general cargo container. Many of these have been speci-
fically designed to accommodate the movement of special
21

coiranodities or unusual cargos. The following specific types
of containers are in common use:
Open-top containers: This design facilitates the over-
head loading of cargo such as machinery, sheet glass and long
objects that may be unsuitable for end loading apparatus.
Refrigerated containers: "REEFER" containers are con-
structed of air-tight and heat-shielding materials. A built
in or hookup refrigeration unit provides a low temperature
for spoilable shipments such as chemicals, drugs or perisha-
ble foodstuffs. The temperature is normally adjustable to
allow various refrigeration or freezer uses.
Controlled temperature containers: These containers are
heavily insulated to limit the range of temperature loss or
gain and are most commonly used to transport delicate, elec-
tronic instruments.
Heated containers: Heated containers, which require
either self-contained heaters or hookup facilities, are
utilized in cold climates to prevent damage to cargo from
freezing, cracking and brittleness. These containers are
commonly used to transport cosmetics through colder regions
of the United States and Canada.
Ventilated containers: This type of container ensures a
constant air flow around such cargos as perishable foods and
hides and skins which can not withstand excess moisture.
Tank containers: Within a structure which conforms to
standardized container dimensions, a tank may be fitted to
22

allow the movement of liquid cargos such as fuel, alcoholic
beverages or chemicals.
Shallow tank containers: This is a special form of the
tank container that is normally less than eight feet high to
permit the transport of high density liquids. This config-
uration allows the weight of the full container to remain
within the capacity of most container handling cranes.
Gondola containers: The main features of an adjustable
wooden floor and of telescoping corner posts make this con-
tainer ideal for loading of various quantities of variable
sized material. Bulk materials which are conventionally
packed in drums, boxes or crates are frequently shipped in
gondola containers.
Automobile containers: Although the use of these con-
tainers is obvious when configured to carry automobiles, they
may also be easily modified to transport long lengths of
lumber, pipe, metal bar stock or finished iron and steel
material.
Livestock carriers: The livestock container is equipped
with windows, feed boxes and footlocks to prevent the animal
from slipping during movement. Although typically used for
shipping cattle and horses, these containers can be con-
figured to carry nearly any type of live animal.
The containers described are the most commonly used
among the various modes; however, the types of containers
available are limited only by the manufacturing decisions of
23

the sixty-seven companies in the container manufacturing in-
dustry. Available containers, therefore, can range from the
comprehensive line offered by such giants as Fruehauf of the
United States and several Japanese firms to single option or
specifically designed units available from several European
firms [Ref . 4: 13]
.
E. MAJOR CONTAINER HANDLING EQUIPMENT
Although a multitude of equipment has contributed to the
container revolution, only a broad view of major container
handling equipment is presented here. The purpose of omit-
ting such items as specialized forklifts, hoists, trailers,
skids, and lashing and securing equipment is not to detract
from their value in container movement, but to highlight the
pieces of equipment that have played a major role in realiz-
ing the potentialities of containerization.
The maritime pioneers, Sea-Land and Matson, proved the
utility and significance of cranes used in conjunction with
container loading and unloading of ships. Clearly, without
this vital equipment, the containerization concept could not
have been realized within the maritime industry. Cranes
commonly utilized by maritime industry include:
Shipboard mounted gantry cranes: Because the ship is
not dependent upon port loading and unloading equipment,
these cranes can assume significant value. They operate
along tracks installed at the outer edges of the ship's
24

hatches and are able to easily position their lifting
mechanism over the container to be moved.
Dockside container gantry cranes: These rail-mounted
cranes can be used to handle all types of cargo, but are
specifically designed to move containers weighing as much
as thirty tons.
Goliath gantry cranes: These track-mounted cranes are
capable of moving extremely large loads. Although not spe-
cifically designed to move containers, they are fully capable
of performing this task.
Freepath gantry cranes: These immense cranes are highly
mobile and able to maneuver on individually steerable wheels
to ships inaccesible to a track constrained crane.
General purpose harbor and mobile cranes: These cranes
are normally configured as boom cranes rather than gantries
and are capable of efficiently performing such diverse tasks
as ship-side evolutions as well as truck and railway car
loading or unloading.
Instrumental container handling equipment includes not
only these giant cranes, but also other specialized, inter-
modal lifting and moving devices. Straddle carriers, spread-
ers and container lifters all perform specialized container
movement functions based on the requirements of the mode and
the containers being moved. [Ref. 4: 52]
A straddle carrier is designed higher, wider and usually
longer than the load it is to transport. This carrier is
25

driven over a container and vertically lifts it for moving
or for stacking up to three units high. These carriers are
very flexible in all modal operations; however, the use of
these straddle carriers in conjunction with gantry cranes in
a maritime terminal system offers the maximum of efficiency
in container movement [Ref. 6: 31].
Other types of container lifters grasp a container from
the side on the top and bottom frames to move it, while yet
others apply pressure to the opposite side or end frames to
perform the lift. Additionally, scissor lifts and tail lifts
on trailers, railway flat cars and platforms both contribute
to container movement.
Used with either cranes or forklifts, spreaders are de-
signed to keep a container level during its movement to en-
sure that the containerized cargo is not damaged. When
utilized with cranes to load specially constructed cellular
container ships, these spreaders are of further importance
because they prevent damage to the container cell loading
guides.
The whole concept of containerization is based on the
advantages to be gained from a through transportation system,
but without the development and refinement of major container
handling equipment, these advantages would yet to be realized
26

F. THE ADVANTAGES OF CONTAINERIZATION
The ideal situation in the movement of goods from origin
to destination is to use equipment constructed to be handled
by all links in the transport chain. It is in the provision
of such equipment that the container comes into its own. The
shipper is able to load the container on his own premises,
have it hauled by road or rail to a suitable port where it is
loaded on a containership, transported to the foreign port,
unloaded to an internal transport system, and delivered to
his customer without each individual package of the consign-
ment being handled at each intermediate stage. It is this
"through" concept of containerization which considerably re-
duces the need for manpower, changes the system into a
capital intensive one, and thus allows savings to be made.
Conventional methods involve the use of several smaller
operators, each of which could well delay the consignment on
its journey. For example, a typical shipment could conceiva-
bly pass through the hands of the original vendor, a forward-
ing agent, a packaging firm, a road hauler and/or the railway
system, the port authority, dock workers, custom officials,
ships' stevedores, the shipping company, and a similar chain
on arrival of the transporting vessel in an overseas port,
before final delivery to the consignee could be effected.
Each operator would assess his own costs and charge accord-
ingly, and each stage would require documentation covering
that part of the journey only. Using a fully containerized
27

system, however, where a through movement is made possible,
most of these intermediaries are eliminated, and it is possi-
ble to radically revise documentation. Ideally the container
should not be opened en route, and, if an effective locking
system is used, pilferage can be greatly reduced.
A long transportation pipeline, however, is not a pre-
requisite to realizing the advantages of containerization
.
Containers are attractive to shippers simply because of re-
duced cost. Such savings are the result of reduced handling,
reduced damage, reduced pilferage, less packaging, reduced
paperwork and lower transportation cost [Ref. 7: 191].
Typically, the rugged construction of a properly loaded
container greatly reduces damage and breakage of cargo. The
frequency of handling the actual cargo is greatly reduced by
containerization, and with reduced commodity handling comes
reduced risk of damage. Through containerization, products
arrive in better condition enabling companies to pursue sig-
nificant advantages in marketing and distribution.
Containers also reduce pilferage, a common occurrence
with shipments of whiskey and other high value products, and
at times referred to as "...an undeclared fringe benefit of
longshoremen" [Ref. 1: 51]. The use of containers has, to
a large extent, eliminated this fringe benefit, and produced
large savings. For example, it has been estimated that
twenty per cent of all whiskey shipped conventionally through
28

New York was disappearing before containers were utilized
[Ref . 6: 40]
.
Perhaps the greatest costs in transportation for a ship-
per are his packing and packaging charges. Prior to contain-
erization, all export shipments had to be specially packed,
utilizing wood or certain types of damp-resistant paper to
offset shipboard climatic conditions. Containers have cut
packaging costs considerably. Export shipments in containers
require no more packaging than domestic shipments thus
«
achieving significant savings. The dollars saved could very
well give the merchant a competitive edge in his selling
price or allow him to enter markets previously beyond his
economic reach.
A counter argument is that crating and packaging costs
are replaced by costs of the additional weight and volume of
the container. In most cases, however, these costs are
transparent to the user: containers are supplied to the
shipper by the carrier, and similarly to other carrier-owned
transportation equipment, escape freight charges. Rates are
based on weight of contents or volume of container.
In addition to dollar savings, containerized cargo has
the potential to reduce paperwork. Although containers are
still hampered by the "paper barrier," a container could con-
ceivably be shipped from consignor to consignee on only a
single bill of lading. Currently a container outbound from
the United States requires forty-six documents, while an
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inbound container requires seventy-eight [Ref. 1: 51].
However, due primarily to the efforts of the National Com-
mittee on International Trade Documentation, an international
coordinator for trade paperwork, the voluminous documentation
is being streamlined [Ref. 8: 73]. The Committee's most
significant achievement has been the international acceptance
of the simplified Standard Master form of documentation. Al-
though this standard form does not directly replace all docu-
mentation, it allows, through the use of chemically-treated
paper, the simultaneous completion of the most commonly used
shipping documents.
Containerization changes the material handling function
from a labor intensive to a capital intensive operation.
Less labor is required to handle containerized freight be-
cause the container, by definition alone, is too large and
too heavy to be manually moved. Especially in periods of
continual inflationary labor costs, many firms have found
containerization to be a desirable avenue for increasing
productivity and controlling material handling costs. Labor
savings as well as greater time efficiency in the transfer
of containers among modes is well illustrated by the conclu-
sions of the National Port Council for berth productivity
for different handling systems:
Containers: Thirty tons can be loaded and unloaded per man
hour.
Pallets: 4.5 tons can be loaded and unloaded per man hour.
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Conventional: 1.7 tons can be loaded and unloaded per man
hour.
Hence, containerization can achieve an eighteenfold and
sevenfold increase in productivity when compared to the con-
ventional and pallet handling systems respectively. [Ref. 3:
79]
Clearly, there is no doubt that containerization pre-
sents advantages. Containerization has pronouncedly achieved
its objectives of reduced transportation costs and better and
more reliable customer service [Ref. 9: 33].
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III. CONTAINERIZATIQN IN THE MILITARY
Since the first use of containers on a sizeable scale in
the 1950 's, the military has recognized the importance and
benefits of containerizaton in its world-wide logistics ef-
fort. Because of the inherent advantages of containerized
cargo movement including the ability to move large quantities
of material effectively and rapidly, the military has long
been an advocate of container ization.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY-OWNED STANDARD CONTAINERS
After World War II a review was made of the Army's basic
logistic system. From this review, it became readily ap-
parent that a method of consolidation of shipments and re-
duced handling was needed. The first container experimented
with in 1948 was constructed of wood and was utilized to
ship household goods to and from overseas. Metal containers
were first used in 19 52 to move cargo from Columbus General
Depot in Ohio to Yokohama, Japan, and eventually into Korea.
In 1956, the Departments of the Army and Air Force agreed to
the world-wide joint operation of a Container Express (CONEX)
service to provide a global system for the consolidation and
rapid movement of critical cargos for troop supply support.
In the 1960 's, the Army's accumulated inventory of ap-
proximately 225,000 CONEXs represented the world's largest
32

container fleet. Although the Army is no longer purchasing
non-ISO standard CONEXs , they were initially constructed of
steel in two sizes (6 ' 3" x 6 ' 10 . 5" x 4 3" and x8'6") capable
of being intermixed for shipping, tiering, or storing. The
type I CONEX, designed for high density cargo, is one-half
the size of the type II but has the same weight capacity of
9,000 pounds as the larger type II. The type II container is
the most popular size and was considered the backbone of sup-
port during the Vietnam conflict.
In May 1967, Colonel R. E. Wheelis, Director of Transpor-
tation at the United States Army Material Command, stated
that the military container must be light in weight, able to
fit in standard container wells, and compatible with fast de-
ployment logistic ships, C-5 and C-141 aircraft, roll on/roll
off (RO/RO) vessels, military cargo helicopters, military
transport vehicles, material handling equipment and ISO
standards [Ref. 10: 7]. Such a system was implemented in
May 1968 with the initial procurement of 2,000 containers and
1,750 chassis. An additional 4,700 containers and 2,635
chassis were approved by the Department of Defense (DOD) with
Fiscal Year 1969 funds. The complete procurement package
consisted of a container, a coupleable chassis, and a movable
bogey. The chassis and bogey are generally used as one unit
defined as a semi-trailer with framework (chassis) supporting
the container for over-the-road movement and equipped with




These 6,700 military vans (MILVANS) are today's military-
owned intermodal fleet of 8x8x20-feet cargo containers com-
parable to commercial containers that follow ISO standards.
Of the MILVANS procured, 4,500 had built-in restraint
systems to permit transport of ammunition. Although efforts
have been made to secure accreditation by the U.S. Coast
Guard and American Association of Railroads of restraint sys-
tems to permit carriage of ammunition in commercial contain-
ers, these 4,500 restraint MILVANS are currently the only
ones approved for ammunition transport. These restraint
MILVANS as well as the remaining 2,200 non-restraint MILVANS
are dispersed throughout the continental United States and
overseas DOD organizations and installations.
B. CONTAINERIZED CARGO MOVEMENT WITHIN THE MILITARY
To appreciate the movement of containerized cargo in the
military, a basic understanding of the military transporta-
tion system is required. Historically, military transporta-
tion responsibilities have been organized along modal lines
with DOD maintaining and operating sufficient peacetime,
government-owned transportation resources in each of the
modes to meet contingency requirements which are unable to
be met by commercial sources.
These resources constitute the Defense Transportation
System (DTS) which is operated along service lines, with the
Army, Air Force, and Navy assigned specific transportation
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responsibilities. The Army executes its responsibilities for
ocean terminal service and land transportation through the
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) . The Air Force
meets its air transportation responsibilities through the
Military Airlift Command (MAC) . The Navy performs its re-
sponsibilities for ocean transportation through the Military
Sealift Command (MSC)
.
Each of these transportation agencies acts as the single
manager for the particular mode of transportation provided
and either purchases transportation services from commercial
carriers or arranges shipment via DOD organic transportation
assets. These individual agencies report via their own par-
ticular military service chain of command to their respective
service secretary who is in turn responsible to the Secretary
of Defense. The Secretary of Defense, as the overall manager
of the DTS, disseminates major transportation policy and di-
rection to MTMC, MAC, and MSC.
Each transportation agency, as the single manager for its
respective transportation responsibilities, is accountable
for executing these DOD policies. As such, these agencies
hold the key to the success of the entire DTS operation gen-
erally and, specifically, the effectiveness and efficiency
of containerized cargo movement in the military.
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C. MSC AND CONTAINERIZED CARGO MOVEMENT
An integral part of the DT3 is the Military Sealift Com-
mand whose primary mission is to provide sealift capability
for not only the Navy but also the entire DOD and other
authorized government agencies. As part of the operating
forces of the Navy, MSC is responsible through its Commander
(COMSC) to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) . COMSC is
the executive agent of the Secretary of the Navy, who, in
turn, is the single manager for all DOD sealift require-
ments. As such, COMSC is responsible for carrying out the
mission of MSC.
As the military's sealift manager, COMSC is organized
world-wide and, hence, is ideally suited to take best advan-
tage of containerization. Under the direction and^ authori-
zation of COMSC, each of the four MSC Commanders is
responsible for sealift capability in their respective
areas of Europe, Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East. Besides
a headquarters office in each of these areas, additional
ancillary offices are widely dispersed within each area to
ensure effective MSC sealift operations world-wide.
Specific responsibility for the maintenance and advance-
ment of intermodal sealift capabilities rests with the Cargo
Division of COMSC. The Director of the Cargo Division is
responsible for exercising management control over the opera-
tional functions of moving DOD cargo via intermodal trans-
portation systems in MSC-controlled ships, recommending and
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taking appropriate action to improve container utilization,
and determining and evaluating current and future world-wide
availability of commercial containers and other intermodal
transportation services. [Ref. 11: 3T-5-3T-6]
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY ON CONTAINER SEALIFT
Because containerization has become the dominant method
of carriage in ocean transportation, DOD has recognized that
military requirements for both peacetime and contingency
operations will have to be met through a changing mix of
increasingly containerized and decreasingly break-bulk sea-
lift capabilities- Consequently, it is the intent of DOD to
capitalize fully upon the inherent advantages of containeri-
zation and, within the constraints of resource availability,
containerize all ocean-going military cargo that is suscepti-
ble to containerization while remaining consistent with
operational circumstances [Ref. 12: 2].
In accomplishing this goal, it is also DOD policy to rely
primarily on the use of commercial container resources inso-
far as these resources are responsive to military require-
ments. For those remaining requirements that cannot be met
by commercial sources, DOD-owned or long-term leased contain-
er services under the direction of MSC are authorized as a
means of satisfying military requirements. As a result of
this policy, it is incumbent on MSC, as the sole military
operating agency responsible for the ocean transportation
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requirements of its customers, to utilize the advantages of





Since January 1978, MSC has been utilizing Army-owned
MILVANS on loan to the Navy to meet the sealift requirements
of Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (COMNAVSUPSYSCOM)
for dry cargo container service on four Pacific logistics
pipelines. In January 1982, the Army initiated a recall of
all MILVANS in MSC possession [Ref. 13: 1]. This recall, to
be completed by September 1983, has the potential for dis-
rupting dry cargo resupply service on these Pacific logistics
pipelines
.
A. MILVAN SERVICE DEVELOPMENT AND MILVAN RECALL
In November 1976, COMNAVSUPSYSCOM addressed the require-
ments of MILVAN service to Naval Station, Midway and Naval
Communications Station, Diego Garcia [Ref. 14: 1]. These
initial requirements have eventually evolved into MSC cur-
rently providing dry cargo container service because of the
lack of through commercial container service for the follow-
ing pipelines:
1. Between Oakland and Midway, Wake, and Diego Garcia;
2. Between Port Hueneme and Diego Garcia and Antarctica;
3. Between Pearl Harbor and Midway, Wake, and Subic Bay;
and
4. Between Subic Bay and Diego Garcia.
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To meet these requirements, COMSC established four pools
of 8x8x20 feet dry cargo containers in Oakland, Port Hueneme
,
Pearl Harbor, and Subic Bay. These four pools are supported
by container assets obtained through a Memorandum of Agree-
ment (MOA) between the U.S. Army Material Development and
Readiness Command (DARCOM) and MSC [Ref . 15: 1-3] . This
MOA, signed in November 1977, is the basis for providing MSC
with the serviceable MILVANS and MILVAN chassis with bogies
to meet current COMNAVSUPSYSCOM containerized dry cargo sea-
lift requirements.
As of January 1982, container assets to meet these re-
quirements consisted of 645 restraint and 20 non-restraint
MILVANS on loan to MSC by DARCOM [Ref. 16] . However, in
accordance with the MOA provisions, DARCOM 's letter of 26
January 1982 announced the recall of all restraint MILVANS
to support the Army- sponsored Containerized Ammunition Dis-
tribution System (CADS) and ammunition related contingency
requirements. Because the twenty non-restraint MILVANS can
be converted to use in the CADS, these are also being sub-
jected to recall by September 1983 [Ref. 16]
.
B. CONTAINER SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
Precipitated by the pending loss of its MILVAN assets to
support the four established container pools, COMSC requested
COMNAVSUPSYSCOM to reconfirm its requirement for MSC-provided
container service [Ref, 17: 1]. Concurrently, COMSC
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requested the Pacific and Far East Area Commanders having
cognizance over these container pools to provide dry contain-
er requirements under the assumption that the MSC-provided
container service to COMNAVSUPSYSCOM was to be continued at
the existing level [Ref. 18: 1]. COMNAVSUPSYSCOM has vali-
dated the required logistics support to continue the current
readiness posture [Ref. 19: 1 and Ref. 20: 2]. Based on
its evaluation of the Area Commanders' responses [Ref. 21: 1
and Ref. 22: 1], COMSC has identified the long term require-
ment for acquiring 680, twenty-foot dry cargo containers to
replace lost MILVAN assets and to be positioned as follows:
Oakland, 80 containers; Port Hueneme , 125 containers; Pearl
Harbor, 125 containers; and Subic Bay, 350 containers.
C. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
DARCOM's recall of the MILVAN assets used by MSC to sup-
port COMNAVSUPSYSCOM 's four Pacific logistics pipelines has
created the need to obtain 680 twenty-foot dry cargo contain-
ers equivalent to the current MILVAN specifications consider-
ing today's ISO container standards. The central issue that
requires resolution is determining the most cost-effective
method to acquire the required containers.
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V. AN OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL OCEAN CONTAINER ACQUISITION
This chapter describes from the perspective of the po-
tential purchaser the market for new ocean containers. In a
general way, it answers the questions of where should one buy
them, what is the price, and what are the considerations in-
volved in financing an acquisition through a long term lease.
The term "leasing companies" is used in the following
sections. Leasing companies are businesses that acquire
containers either through purchase or long term lease and
then, in turn, lease them on a short term basis to shipping
companies. While a true long term lease is ten to fifteen
years, leasing companies generally do not provide leases for
more than a five year period. However, leasing companies
will occasionally act as brokers of long term leases.
A. GEOGRAPHY OF SUPPLY
The major sources of standard steel ocean containers are
Korean and Japanese manufacturers who share about equally
seventy-five to eighty percent of the market. Taiwanese
suppliers provide a significant portion of the remaining
market share. China, Italy, Germany, France, South Africa,
and the United Kingdom manufacture relatively small amounts.





There are two reasons for the Japanese and Korean domi-
nance. The obvious reason is efficiency. Japan combines the
world's most efficient container production lines with steel
from the world's most efficient mills. Korean producers are
only a small step behind Japanese in labor efficiency while
offering lower wages than in Japan. The situation of Taiwan
is similar to that of Korea. Both Taiwan and Korea draw on
Japan for steel supplies.
The second reason for market dominance is not obvious.
It stems from the nature of the container shipping business.
From the perspective of the shipping line, a new container is
not useful until it is positioned in a location where the
line has freight. Thus the appropriate measure of container
procurement expense to a commercial shipping firm includes
the insurance and freight to a high demand port. On a trans-
oceanic container positioning move, these costs are in the
range of four hundred to seven hundred dollars per container.
Thus the container market responds to average patterns of
supply and demand, and positioning expenses are minimized if
container manufacturers are located where there is—on the
average—the greatest demand for the shipment of goods in
containers. For the past decade the greatest demand for
space has been in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
In summary, a purchaser generally buys containers from
North Asian manufacturers because they are high quality con-
tainers and, once having been purchased, can be loaded
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directly without paying a positioning charge in addition to
the purchase price.
B. PRICES AND TERMS EX FACTORY
In discussing container prices ex factory, it is suffi-
cient to limit the consideration to twenty-foot containers.
This is because the price for forty-foot containers is a
stable multiple of the twenty- foot container price. Both the
factories and their customers use a factor of 1.65 to relate
the price of forty-foot containers to the price of twenty-
foot containers. For example, if a manufacturer will deliver
a twenty- foot container for $2100, then its price for a
forty- foot container will be $2100 x 1.55 = $3465.
The terms of a particular production run are set in
advance by a contract which specifies the physical charac-
teristics in detail and defines precisely the financial
arrangements. The container prices in these contracts are
determined by two sets of factors: one internal to the ac-
quisition and the other external to the acquisition.
1 . Features Internal to a Contract Which Influence Price
a. Design Details
Containers differ significantly in design and
construction specifications. The biggest difference is in
material: aluminum, corten steel (atmospheric corrosion-
resistant steel) , or mild steel (noncorrosion-resistant
steel) . Each material choice introduces more subtle choices
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of section shapes, reinforcement schemes, and painting
systems.
Each manufacturer will have a standard design
for each of the three materials, but most larger customers
specify their own details with the understanding that the
greater the divergence from factory standard, the greater
the price.
There are general indicators of magnitudes.
Aluminum is about twice the cost of mild steel. Corten steel
is about ten per cent more expensive than mild steel. The
most idiosyncratic design details are ten to fifteen per cent
more expensive than the standard design details,
b. Financial Details
The prices for containers will vary wit-h the pay-
ment terms. Almost always there is a discount available for
cash payment at delivery. But more conventionally the manu-
facturers provide 90 to 180 days credit, in which case they
add on not only contractual interest but also a little extra
to cover foreign exchange risk and customer risk.
2 . Features External to a Contract Which Influence Price
a. Capacity Utilization
The Asian manufacturers display corporate behav-
ior unusual in the United States: when demand goes down they
lower prices and, if demand goes way down, they lower prices
significantly. Conversely, they ration their production
during periods of high demand by increasing prices rapidly.
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The swing from price peak to trough can be as much as twenty-
five per cent.
b. Foreign Exchange Rate
The majority of purchase contract prices are in
dollars, but the costs are in yen, won, or NT (Taiwanese)
dollars. Thus any significant currency realignments will
affect container prices. For example, the yen has fallen
from 190 yen per $1 to 255 per $1. Dollar purchasers have
seen the dollar price of Japanese containers decline as a
consequence
.
c. Price of Steel and Aluminum
As an approximation, steel inputs account for
half the cost of a steel container, and aluminum inputs ac-
count for two-thirds to three-fourths of the price of an
aluminum container. Thus changes in the market price of
these materials will be reflected in proportional changes in
the container prices.
The reason for enumerating these major external
and internal factors in the pricing of containers is to pro-
vide a basis for understanding why one cannot easily say what
containers cost. Instead, one can provide a range determined
by the external features at any point in time. Today the
range for steel twenty- foot containers is $1800 to $2200. A
year ago the range was $2100 to $2500. Where a particular
acquisition falls within the range is a function of the in-
ternal features explained above.
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A final variable worth noting is the role of the
trading company. Most container purchasers work through a
Japanese trading company of which Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and
C. Itoh are the most active in this field. The trading com-
panies act as middlemen in the transaction and charge a fee
of about one to three per cent of the purchase price. They
are critical to the quality control function. Failure to
manage quality control has left many purchasers with equip-
ment grossly different than that specified in the contract,
and this experience should serve to alert a prospective pur-
chaser in cases where the terms of an acquisition seem un-
usually attractive.
C. LEASING RATHER THAN BUYING
The contract between the manufacturer and the user of the
equipment is largely independent of the way the user chooses
to finance the acquisition. The major alternatives are pur-
chasing and acquiring by long term lease. In the lease case,
the user or user's agent arranges the contract with the manu-
facturer. The contract is then assigned to the party who
will own the equipment and receive the lease payments.
The lease alternative exists primarily because many con-
tainer users cannot use the tax benefits accruing to the
owner of the equipment. Such users include public entities
such as a national shipping company. Hence, the lessor may
be a party who has taxable income from other business
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ventures and needs tax shelters or credits. Additionally,
lessors exist as independent JLeasing firms.
The terms of long term container leases are determined by
the state of the financial markets because the lessor views
the transaction as just another form of long term financial
investment. Thus, the price or "the lease rate factor" goes
up or down with the long term interest rates in the market.
Currently, for ten year leases, the lease rate factor is
about .15; in other words, the annual lease payment is fif-
teen per cent of the purchase price of the container. If the
long term rates come down to twelve per cent, the lease rate
factor would be around .13 to .133 depending on the cus-
tomer's credit worthiness.
In addition to the variables of long term interest rates
and credit worthiness of lessee, the purchase option in the
lease agreement can influence lease costs. This type of
option is determined by the lessee's requirements and the
lessor's legal constraints as reflected in current tax legis-




VI. BASELINE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE PROBLEM SOLUTIONS
An analysis inquiring into the costs and benefits of a
program whose characteristics are assumed to be given can
center on two different types of questions. The first is the
complete cost-benefit question: whether the value of all
benefits exceeds that of all the costs. The evaluation ques-
tion can also be turned around to ask the second type of
question: for several alternative courses of action that
accomplish a particular goal or program, which is the least
expensive? It is the second type of question that this
analysis endeavors to answer by performing a comparative or
cost-effectiveness evaluation of alternative problem
solutions
.
A. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS
The objective of this analysis is to assist decision
makers within COMSC in determining the most cost-effective
method of acquiring standard containers to replace lost
MILVAN assets. Because decision makers at various levels
within COMSC have identified the acquisition requirement to
be 680 steel, twenty- foot length containers conforming to
current ISO and industry standards, this analysis will evalu-





For purposes of this analysis, a typical twenty-foot
steel container conforming to ISO and current industry stan-
dards is defined as measuring 8*6"x8'x20' and usually con-
structed of corrugated sheet steel walls that are welded to
the main structural top and bottom side rails and end frames,
which are of fabricated or. shaped steel sections. The end
frames are fitted with corner fittings (steel castings to
provide a means of handling, stacking and securing contain-
ers) at all eight corners that are usually welded to the four
corner posts, top and bottom side and front rails, and rear
door sill and header. The roof is normally flat sheet steel
welded to the top side and end rails and door header, and has
interior roof bows for support. The doors are usually ply-
metal (steel-faced wood) panels fitted with locking hardware
and weatherproof seals. The floor is normally constructed of
hard laminated woods, planking or plywood either screwed or
bolted to the cross members. Cross members that support the
floor are variously configured beams bolted or welded to the
bottom side rails. Although exact specifications can vary,
this analysis will be based on high quality specifications
currently used by such industry leaders as Container Trans-
port International, Incorporated; Transamerica ICS ; ITEL Con-
tainer Division; Genstar Container Corporation; and American
President Lines, Limited. Using such specifications without
proprietary rights will ensure that the containers ultimately
acquired are high quality steel containers that are readily
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available from commercial sources. As a cautionary note, it
is pointed out that any major deviations from the general
specifications given and from specifications in common use by
industry leaders can significantly alter the results of this
analysis
.
B. ALTERNATIVES AND CRITERION FOR RANKING ALTERNATIVES
The alternatives evaluated in this analysis to meet the
long term requirement for 680 steel 8'6"x8'x20' containers
are:
1. Alternative One: Negotiating a long term lease without
an option to buy.
2. Alternative Two: Negotiating a long term lease with an
option to buy at the expiration of the lease contract.
3. Alternative Three: Negotiating a purchase of the re-
quired containers.
The criterion for the selection and ranking of alterna-
tives is fixed effectiveness with minimum cost to COMSC in
providing the required level of container service to
COMNAVSUPSYSCOM for support of its four Pacific logistics
pipelines. The principle reason for the selection of this
criterion is COMNAVSUPSYSCOM' s stated objective of maintain-
ing the required logistics support to continue the current
readiness posture. [Ref. 19: 1 and Ref. 20: 2]
C. THE COST MODEL
Because all of the alternatives selected for evaluation
are capable of supporting COMNAVSUPSYSCOM' s current readiness
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posture, the focus of the evaluation of alternatives is on
minimizing the costs required to achieve and maintain this
posture. To identify and accumulate costs, this analysis
utilizes a cost model consisting of:
1. Cost Component One (CI): A lease rate factor based on
the state of financial markets.
2. Cost Component Two (C2) : An option to buy factor based
on legal constraints reflected in current tax laws.
3. Cost Component Three (C3) : Purchase price as a function
of specifications, credit terms, quality control, and nego-
tiating skills.
4. Cost Component Four (C4) : Pick-up charge as determined
by supply and demand of containers at the desired pick-up
point.
5. Cost Component Five (C5) : Depot handling charge at the
desired pick-up point.
6. Cost Component Six (C6) : Drayage (line haul charge) from
desired pick-up point to desired military depot at on-hire
of containers.
7. Cost Component Seven (C7) : Drayage at off-hire of con-
tainers from military depot to desired drop-off point.
8. Cost Component Eight (C8) : Depot handling charge at
drop-off point.
9. Cost Component Nine (C9) : Drop-off charge as determined




10. Salvage Value Component (SV) : The residual value of a
container that can be realized at the end of its economic
life.
Maintenance and repair costs as well as all other costs
associated with containerized cargo movement are not ad-
dressed because these costs are invariant since containers
must be maintained, repaired, and transported by the user
regardless whether they are leased or purchased. The total
cost equation will be in the general form of:
TC = (ClxC3) + C3 +C4 + C5 + C6 +C7 + C8 + C9 + (C2xC3) - SV.
However, the cost components will differ among alternatives
being considered and will be deleted as appropriate to the
alternative
.
D. ALTERNATIVE ONE: LONG TERM LEASE WITHOUT THE OPTION TO
BUY
1 . Alternative One Assumptions
The economic life and long term lease are for a
period of ten years. An economic life of ten years is con-
sidered appropriate based on the typical economical lives
used by industry leaders. A long term lease period of ten
years is based on COMNAVSUPSYSCOM' s long term commitment to
support its four Pacific logistics pipelines.
Delivery and control of leased containers will be
made to Military Sealift Command, Pacific (MSCPAC) for fur-
ther repositioning to container pools, and will occur
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instantaneously versus incrementally, MSCPAC is assumed to
be the control point because it serves as the Area Commander
for three of the four container pools and is the major focal
point for the majority of containerized cargo movement. In-
stantaneous versus incremental delivery to MSCPAC as well as
instantaneous redelivery to the lessor at the expiration of
the negotiated lease is assumed in order to simplify cost
calculations. It is believed, however, that this simplifi-
cation will not adversely distort cost estimates.
Leased containers will be obtained through major West
Coast container leasing companies offering high quality steel
containers of new or like-new construction. New or like-new
construction is defined as recently manufactured containers
used only in a positioning move from factory to desired pick-
up location. The assumption to acquire container assets
through West Coast container leasing companies is based on a
normally inherent desire to reduce pick-up, drop-off, and
drayage charges. New or like-new construction is assumed to
support a ten year economic life to eliminate or minimize
exchange of container assets between the lessor and lessee.
The long term lease rate for a ten year period is
assumed to be a function of the financial markets because
major container leasing companies view container leasing as
another form of long term investment. An annual long term
lease rate of fifteen per cent of the purchase price of a
steel container meeting specifications of industry leaders is
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assumed based on a review of the current, nominal-risk, long
term investment opportunities.
The purchase price for a new or like-new steel con-
tainer used for computing the long term lease basic cost is
$2100. This assumed purchase price represents an average of
purchase prices formulated in late September 1982 by major
container leasing companies and major ocean carriers of con-
tainerized cargo.
Pick-up and drop-off charges, and all drayage and
handling charges in the San Francisco Bay area are typical
of actual charges that will be incurred. This assumption is
made to permit the use of specific quotes of these charges
obtained from industry leaders located in close proximity of
MSCPAC
.
All costs are stated in 1982 dollars because they are
utilized to support economic analysis purposes versus bud-
getary purposes.
2. Alternative One Baseline Costs
The pertinent cost components associated with this
alternative can be utilized to form the total cost (TC) equa-
tion of one container as follows:
TC = (ClxC3) + C4 + C5 + C6 + C7 + C8 + C9 .
This equation can be further manipulated to yield the total
annual cost of leasing 680 standard steel containers for each
year of the ten year lease period.
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Using a lease rate factor (CI) of fifteen per cent
and a purchase price (C3) of $2100 per container, the annual
basic cost of leasing 680 containers is $214,200.
Based on representative quotes from major container
leasing firms and shippers, the pick-up charge (C4) of $35
per container is utilized for cost estimating. Hence, in
year one of the lease period, the total pick-up costs are
$23,800.
The depot handling charge at the desired pick-up
point (C5) is also based on typical costs cited by industry
leaders. Using a charge of $2 5 per container produces total
handling charges of $17,000 in year one.
The drayage charge at on-hire (C6) of $30 per con-
tainer was similarly ascertained and yields total drayage
costs in year one of $20,400.
The foregoing costs are required to achieve and main-
tain a level of container service to sustain COMNAVSUPSYSCOM'
s
current readiness posture. The costs addressed below are
those that will be incurred at lease expiration at the end of
year ten and are mirror images of the accessorial charges of
cost components C4 , C5, and C6
.
Drayage at off-hire (C7) of $30 per container will
add $20,400 to year ten costs while the depot handling charge
at the desired drop-off point (C8) of $25 per container will
increase costs in year ten by $17,000. Finally, using an as-
sumed typical drop-off charge at the lessor's depot (C9) of
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$35 per container will cause the total cost to rise by
another $23,800.
The annual cost of leasing 680 standard steel con-
tainers for each year of the ten year lease period is sum-
marized in Table I. Table I displays both undiscounted and
discounted annual and total baseline costs of alternative
one. The discounted costs, included to show the opportunity
cost of capital, are based on a ten per cent discount rate
established by DOD as the rate to be used in all economic
analyses of proposed Defense investments. The present value
of the baseline costs to implement alternative one is
$1,464,118.
TABLE I
ALTERNATIVE ONE BASELINE COST SUMMARY














E. ALTERNATIVE TWO: LONG TERM LEASE WITH THE OPTION TO BUY
The option to buy feature in a long term lease can be
treated in two fundamental ways. The option to buy cost can
be based on a fair market value to be determined at the ex-
piration of the lease or can be based on a fixed price deter-
mined during initial lease negotiations. The fixed price
method of "buy-out" can take two further forms. It can con-
sist of increased basic leasing costs combined with a nominal
purchase price of, for example, one dollar per container.
The fixed price method can also take the form of a more sub-
stantial fixed purchase price at lease expiration without an
increase in basic leasing costs. Both fundamental methods of
incorporating an option to buy feature into a leasing ar-
rangement have the same effect: compensating the lessor for
his initial investment.
When incorporating an option to buy feature in a leasing
arrangement, the corporate lessor must view it using federal
income tax laws as a backdrop. These tax laws aid in charac-
terizing lease transactions as leases for corporate federal
income tax purposes. Hence, the corporate lessor must ensure
his contractual leasing arrangement is indeed a lease as de-
fined by the federal income tax laws if he is to advanta-
geously use these laws to achieve reduced corporate tax
liability. A major factor in determining whether a lease
has been negotiated for federal income tax purposes is the
treatment of the fixed price option to buy. Prior to the Tax
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Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the Internal
Revenue Service considered the fixed price purchase option
as evidence that a corporate lease transaction was not a
lease for federal income tax purposes [Ref. 23: 22]. How-
ever, once this legislation is in effect, a fixed price
option of at least ten per- cent of the original property or
equipment purchase price will no longer disqualify a cor-
porate lease transaction as a lease for federal income tax
purposes [Ref. 23: 65].
The enactment of this legislation will provide corporate
lessors with a minimum option to buy factor that must be met
to qualify for tax advantages under a leasing arrangement.
Assuming profit to be the prime motivator in corporate be-
havior, corporate lessors will meet this minimum option to
buy factor to maximize profit through advantageous use of tax
laws. Hence, the ten per cent minimum option to buy factor
of this 1982 tax legislation will be used to predict corpor-
ate behavior in determining the cost of an option to buy
feature incorporated in a long term lease.
1 . Alternative Two Assumptions
Assumptions of alternative two include those pre-
viously stated in alternative one; however, additional as-
sumptions are made about the option to buy feature and
salvage value of owned containers acquired through the exer-
cise of the option to buy.
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When evaluating alternatives, it is highly desirable
to compare them using equal periods of time in which expendi-
tures occur and benefits accrue. Thus, to facilitate com-
parison of all alternatives, a ten year lease period is also
used in evaluating alternative two. The choice of this ten
year lease period further permits the continued use of a
fifteen per cent lease rate factor versus a higher factor
precipitated by a shorter term lease, and allows the intro-
duction of an option to buy factor based on current tax
legislation. Therefore, it is assumed that the option to buy
will be exercised at the end of the last year of the ten year
lease period. The cost for exercising this option is repre-
sented by an option to buy factor of ten per cent of the pur-
chase price of a standard steel container. The option to buy
factor is based on the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 requirements and assumes that COMSC will be able
to negotiate the best possible terms for an option to buy
feature
.
This alternative also assumes a salvage value of $300
per container obtained through exercising the option to buy
that can be used to offset other year ten costs. The $300
salvage value arises primarily because of the value of the
steel used in construction of the container and is based on
estimates obtained from major container leasing firms and
ocean carriers of containerized cargo. Furthermore, it is
assumed that this salvage value can be realized at any one
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of the four container pools without the necessity of COMSC
repositioning its containers.
2 . Alternative Two Baseline Costs
Because this alternative assumes a buy-out at the end
of the lease period and at the end of the economic life of a
container, the focus of this alternative is clearly on trad-
ing off buy-out costs and salvage value against the other
year ten costs detailed in alternative one.
By exercising the option to buy, the total cost equa-
tion of one container becomes:
TC = (ClxC3) + C4 + C5 + C6 + (C2xC3) - SV.
This equation can be further manipulated to yield the total
annual cost of leasing with a fixed price option to buy 680
standard steel containers for each year of the ten year lease
period. However, only the costs incurred in year ten will
differ from alternative one.
Using an option to buy factor (C2) of ten per cent
and a purchase price (C3) of $2100 per container, the cost of
exercising the option to buy 680 containers at the end of
year ten is $142,800. •
A salvage value (SV) of $300 per container yields a
total residual value of $204,000 that will be realized in
year ten.
The drayage (C7) , handling (C8) , and drop-off (C9)





Table II displays the undiscounted and discounted
differential costs between alternatives one and two. A ten
per cent discount rate was used to obtain the present value
cost to implement alternative two of $1,414,546.
TABLE II
DIFFERENTIAL COST SUMMARY BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES ONE AND TWO
Cost Item Undiscounted Cost Discounted Cost
Alternative One Costs $2,264,400 $1,464,118
Buy-out Cost $142,800 $57,834
Salvage Value ($204,000) ($82,620)
Drayage Cost ($20,400) ($8,262)
Handling Cost ($17,000) ($6,885)
Drop-off Cost ($23,800) ($9,639)
Alternative Two Costs $2,142,000 $1,414,546
F. ALTERNATIVE THREE: NEGOTIATING A PURCHASE
1 . Alternative Three Assumptions
The previously stated assumptions of a new or like-
new container, a ten year economic life, instantaneous de-
livery and control of containers to MSCPAC , and a $300
salvage value per container from alternatives one and two are
applied to alternative three. The accessorial charges of
pick-up, handling, and drayage at on-hire of leased contain-
ers are also assumed to be incurred at the time of container
purchase because purchased containers must be properly posi-





The purchase price of a new or like-new container
will be primarily a function of specifications, credit terms,
quality control, and negotiating skills. A purchase price of
$2100 F.O.B. West Coast is assumed and presupposes using high
quality specifications similar to those in use by major con-
tainer leasing companies; using credit terms of cash payment
within 180 days; using DOD personnel to perform the quality
control function; and presupposes that COMSC ' s negotiating
skills will achieve the best possible purchase price in to-
day's market.
2 . Alternative Three Baseline Costs
The appropriate cost components of the cost model can
be combined to form the total cost equation of purchasing one
container as follows:
TC = C3 + C4 + C5 + C6 - SV.
This equation can be further manipulated to yield the total
cost of purchasing 680 standard steel containers.
Using a purchase price (C3) of $2100 per container,
the total purchase price of 680 containers is $1,428,000.
Pick-up (C4) , handling (C5) , and drayage (C6) charges
at time of purchase and salvage value (SV) realized in year
ten are the same as calculated in alternatives one and two
and are displayed in Table III.
Table III displays both the undiscounted and dis-
counted total costs of alternative three. A ten per cent

TABLE III
ALTERNATIVE THREE BASELINE COST SUMMARY
Cost Item Undiscounted Cost Discounted Cost
Purchase Price $1,428,000 $1,362,312
Pick-up Cost $23,800 $22,705
Handling Cost $17,000 $16,218
Drayage Cost $20,400 $19,462
Salvage Value ($204,000) ($82,620)
Total $1,285,200 $1,338,077
discount factor was used to obtain the total present value
cost to implement alternative three of $1,338,077.
G. BASELINE ANALYSES SUMMARY
Table IV displays the undiscounted and discounted total
costs of the alternatives evaluated. Using the criterion of
fixed effectiveness with minimum cost to COMSC, alternative
three is the preferred option; however, alternative three is
superior only under the assumptions explicitly stated in the
baseline analyses. The following chapter examines the
strength of alternative three's superiority under varying
assumptions.
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE BASELINE COSTS






VII. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE PROBLEM SOLUTIONS
Cost sensitivity analysis is the method most often used
in dealing with uncertainty in cost estimating and can show
the sensitivity of total cost to particular components of a
total cost model. The basic procedure of cost sensitivity
analysis is to vary the assumptions regarding major parame-
ters and then test the sensitivity of costs to these changed
assumptions. Cost sensitivity, therefore, can be viewed as a
method to aid decision makers when they are uncertain about
the accuracy or the relative importance of information pre-
sented to them. As an aid to decision makers within COMSC,
this technique of addressing uncertainty is applied to .the
major parameters of the lease rate factor, option to buy fac-
tor, salvage value, and the discount rate used to reflect the
cost of capital.
A. LEASE RATE FACTOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As previously stated, the terms of long term container
leases are determined by the state of the financial markets
because the lessor views the transaction as just another form
of long term financial investment. Thus, the lease rate fac-
tor goes up or down with the long term interest rates in the
market. As long term interest rates rise thereby increasing
the basic cost of leasing, alternative three becomes more and
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more attractive while alternatives one and two maintain their
relative order of preference when ranking alternatives using
the fixed effectiveness at minimum cost criterion. However,
as Table V illustrates, as the lease rate factor decreases
from the fifteen per cent level assumed in the baseline
analyses, alternative three is no longer the preferred option
TABLE V
LEASE RATE FACTOR (LRF) COST SENSITIVITY SUMMARY
Alternative 15% LRF 14% LRF 13% LRF 12% LRF
1 $1,464,118 $1,372,056 $1,279,991 $1,187,929
2 $1,414,546 $1,322,484 $1,230,419 $1,138,357
3 $1,338,077 $1,338,077 $1,338,077 $1,338,077
Table V displays the total discounted cost of each al-
ternative assuming various lease rate factors. At a lease
rate factor of fourteen per cent and below, alternative two
is the preferred option and, at all lease rate factors of
thirteen per cent and below, the ranking of alternatives from
the most to the least cost-effective becomes alternative two,
one, and three respectively. Hence, the decision to nego-
tiate either form of leasing arrangement versus negotiating a
purchase is highly sensitive to a lease rate factor near the
magnitude of fifteen per cent.
B. OPTION TO BUY FACTOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The baseline analyses utilized an option to buy factor of
ten per cent of the container purchase price based on minimum
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lease-defining provisions of 1982 tax legislation and assumed
that COMSC would be able to negotiate the best possible terms
for an option to buy feature. Because profit is a prime cor-
porate motivator, cost sensitivity analysis of the option to
buy factor below the minimum ten per cent required to advan-
tageously use federal income tax laws as applied to leases is
not germane. If the option to buy factor does change, it
will move in the upward direction. Table VI, therefore, dis-
plays the total discounted cost of each alternative at various
increasing option to buy factors.
TABLE VI
OPTION TO BUY FACTOR (OBF) COST SENSITIVITY SUMMARY
Alternative 10% OBF 15% OBF 18% OBF 20% OBF
1 $1,464,118 $1,464,118 $1,464,118 $1,464,118
2 $1,414,546 $1,443,823 $1,460,813 $1,472,380
3 $1,338,077 $1,338,077 $1,338,077 $1,338,077
As shown by Table VI, any increase in the option to buy
factor above the baseline case increases the relative advan-
tage of alternative three over alternative two. Thus, the
lease versus purchase decision is rather insensitive to this
factor. However, with an option to buy factor of twenty per
cent or greater, alternative one is more attractive than al-
ternative two, and the initial, baseline ranking of alterna-
tives from most to least cost-effective changes to alternative
three, one and two respectively. Hence, this factor does
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influence the type of long term lease that should be nego-
tiated if a leasing alternative were to be implemented when
the option to buy factor is near the magnitude of twenty per
cent. This influence stems primarily from the strong rela-
tionship between the option to buy factor and the assumed
salvage value. As the option to buy cost begins to exceed
the assumed salvage value, alternative one becomes the pre-
ferred leasing arrangement.
C. SALVAGE VALUE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A salvage value of $300 was assumed throughout the base-
line analyses. However, if this salvage value were to
change, the question of what impact would it have on the
ranking of alternatives quickly arises. Table VII examines
this question by displaying the total discounted cost of each
alternative at three different levels of salvage value.
TABLE VII
SALVAGE VALUE (SV) COST SENSITIVITY SUMMARY
Alternative $0 SV $300 SV $600 SV
1 $1,464,118 $1,464,118 $1,464,118
2 $1,497,116 $1,414,546 $1,331,926
3 $1,420,697 $1,338,077 $1,255,457
As shown by Table VII, the salvage value can double or
drop to zero and alternative three is still the preferred
option. Hence, the lease versus purchase decision is highly
insensitive to the salvage value. At the zero salvage value
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level, however, alternative one is more desirable than alter-
native two, and the initial, baseline ranking of alternatives
from most to least cost-effective changes to alternative
three, one and two respectively. Therefore, the salvage
value does influence the type of long term lease that should
be negotiated if a leasing alternative were to be implemented
when the salvage value approaches zero.
D. DISCOUNT RATE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As required by DOD, the baseline analyses used a ten per
cent discount rate to reflect the opportunity cost of capital,
This rate was determined by what the DOD decision makers felt
would be a fair and honest approximation of the present value
rate for the aggregate of Defense investments. However, DOD
policy does encourage using different discount rates as a
supplement to an analysis based on the prescribed ten per
cent rate. Table VIII summarizes the discounted cost of each
alternative using various discount rates. The factors used
in computing the discounted costs are based on continuous
compounding of interest assuming uniform cash flows through-
out each year of the ten year period.
As illustrated by Table VIII, a discount rate below the
prescribed rate of ten per cent does not affect the initial,
baseline ranking of alternatives. However, using a discount
rate of twelve per cent does change the initial ranking of




DISCOUNT RATE (DR) COST SENSITIVITY SUMMARY
Alternative 8% DR 10% DR 12% DR 14% DR
1 $1,582,141 $1,464,118 $1,360,537 $1,268,920
2 $1,523,267 $1,414,546 $1,318,799 $1,233,669
3 $1,334,487 $1,338,077 $1,339,219 $1,336,629
two, three and one, respectively. Additionally, at a dis-
count rate of fourteen per cent, the ranking of alternatives
changes again to alternative two, one and three with alterna-
tive three being the least cost-effective course of action.
This relative ranking of alternatives established when using
a discount rate of fourteen per cent is consistently main-
tained at increasingly higher discount rates. Hence, the
decision to negotiate either form of leasing arrangement ver-
sus negotiating a purchase is highly sensitive to a discount
rate in the range of ten to fourteen per cent.
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Sensitivity analysis of major parameters was performed
with the purpose of alerting decision makers to their rela-
tive importance. As indicated by the sensitivity analyses
performed, decision makers must be aware of the significant
changes in the ranking of alternatives caused by relatively
minor variations in the lease rate factor used to compute
basic leasing costs and in the discount rate used to reflect
the cost of capital. Additionally, decision makers should
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note the more subtle changes caused by varying the option to
buy factor and salvage value that occur in ranking alterna-
tives one and two within the more narrow consideration of
executing some form of leasing arrangement.
As a final note, sensitivity analysis was not performed
on the purchase price parameter because of the proportional
nature of the total cost model. Because of this proportion-
ality of costs to the purchase price, the relative ranking
of alternatives would not change for a reasonable range of
changes in the purchase price.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The goal of this analysis has been to determine the most
cost-effective method of acquiring standard steel containers
to support COMNAVSUPSYSCOM ' s four Pacific logistics pipe-
lines. In trying to achieve this goal, explicit assumptions
have been made concerning the alternatives being evaluated.
Hence, the conclusions and recommendations presented here are
necessarily based upon these assumptions. It is recognized
and emphasized that the results of this analysis can signi-
ficantly change by varying these underlying assumptions.
However, in the course of obtaining these results, a complete
framework for analysis has been developed and presented.
Therefore, any additional alternatives, such as the leasing
of required containers for a period of five years followed by
a purchase, may be evaluated within this same framework.
Using the fixed effectiveness at minimum cost criterion,
the baseline analysis of the alternatives indicates that al-
ternative three, negotiating a purchase, is the most cost-
effective course of action and should be implemented.
However, as discovered in the sensitivity analysis, the de-
cision of lease versus purchase is highly sensitive to the
specific lease rate factor of fifteen per cent that would
most likely be used to compute basic leasing costs in today's
container leasing environment. Because alternative two.
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negotiating a long term lease with an option to buy, becomes
the most cost-effective course of action at lease rates of
fourteen per cent and lower, the decision to lease with an
option to buy or to negotiate a purchase becomes a function
of the behavior of the long term financial investment market
upon which the lease rate factor is based and of COMSC '
s
skills in negotiating a lease rate. If the state of the long
term financial investment market combines with COMSC ' s nego-
tiating expertise to obtain a lease rate of fourteen per cent
or lower, then leasing with an option to buy is the preferred
course of action that should be implemented.
When ranking lease cost alternatives to achieve a fixed
level of effectiveness, DOD policy is to select the alterna-
tive with the lowest discounted cost because it implies that
resources are allocated more efficiently in the sense that
fewer total resources must be diverted to satisfy the re-
quirement at hand. Additionally, DOD requires future cash
flows to be discounted at a ten per cent rate. When using
this required rate, alternative three, negotiating a pur-
chase, is the most cost-effective alternative that should be
implemented. However, as illustrated in the sensitivity
analysis, when the decision maker considers slightly higher
and perhaps more realistic opportunity costs of capital,
alternative two, negotiating a long term lease with an op-
tion to buy, again becomes the preferred course of action
that should be implemented. Hence, the decision of leasing
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with an option to buy versus negotiating a purchase can be-
come a function of determining the appropriateness of apply-
ing the DOD aggregate investment discount rate of ten per
cent because of its prevalence in past DOD practice.
When reviewing the evaluated alternatives, it is evident
that alternative three, negotiating a purchase, requires a
large initial outlay in year one and depends on a residual
salvage value in year ten for its superiority. Therefore,
there is a degree of risk associated with alternative three.
This risk can be roughly estimated by computing a pay back
period based on the difference in annual cash flows between
negotiating a purchase and negotiating a long term lease with
an option to buy. This computed pay back period of 6.7 years
indicates that alternative three is superior to alternative
two only after sixty-seven per cent of the original lease
period and economic life of a container has expired.
Because of the sensitivity of costs to the lease rate
factor and the discount rate used to reflect the opportunity
cost of capital as well as the risk associated with alterna-
tive three, the superiority of negotiating a purchase over
negotiating a long term lease with an option to buy is
tenuous. Hence, it is recommended that COMSC aggressively
pursue negotiating a long term lease with an option to buy
in an attempt to achieve a lease rate factor of fourteen per
cent or lower. If COMSC is not able to obtain a desirable
lease rate of fourteen per cent or less, COMSC ' s efforts
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should then be directed at negotiating a purchase. By fol-
lowing this course of action, COMSC will have utilized the
viable avenues available to maintain the level of container
service necessary to support COMNAVSUPSYSCOM' s current readi-
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